We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete or disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function. Our agent-centric notion of proof is a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and also yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of standard S5-knowledge.
Introduction
The subject matter of this paper is classical normal modal logic of interactive proofs, i.e., a novel modal logic of negation-complete or disjunctive interactive proofs (LDiiP) as well as an existing modal logic of (negation-incomplete or non-disjunctive) non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP) [Kra12b] . ( We abbreviate interactivity-related adjectives with lower-case letters.) Our goal here is to produce LDiiP axiomatically as well as semantically from LiiP. Note that here we still understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though unable to guess).
Motivation
Our immediate motivation for LDiiP is first the theoretical concept and second the practical application of a negation-complete variant of our interactive proofs [Kra12a, Kra12b] . The overarching motivation for LDiiP is to serve in an intuitionistic foundation of interactive computation. See [Kra12a] for a programmatic motivation.
Theoretical concept
Like in the non-interactive setting, the motivation for negation-complete (maximal) and consistent logical theories (or ultrafilters [DP02] ) and their external and internalised notions of proof is to gain cognitive, constructive, and computational content. Recall that a logical theory T is negation-complete by definition if and only if (written ":iff" hereafter) for all formulas φ in the language (say L) of T, φ ∈ T or ¬φ ∈ T, and that T is consistent :iff ⊥ ∈ T (so T = L), where '¬' designates negation and ⊥ falsehood. (Inconsistent theories are trivially negation-complete.) Given a recursive axiomatisation 1 of and thus an external notion of proof for T, negation completeness and consistency corresponds to the meta-theorem schema T φ or T ¬φ (NC) and T ⊥ , respectively. Compared with LDiiP's internalised agent-centric notion of proof, negation completeness and consistency corresponds to the axiom schema LDiiP (M a φ)∨M a ¬φ and LDiiP ¬(M a ⊥), respectively, where M designates a proof (message) and a an intended proof-checking agent. Notice that our internalisation is more concrete than its external counterpart in the sense that the first speaks about a concrete (internalised) proof (sufficient evidence) M whereas the latter only speaks about an abstract (external) provability T . Hilbert hoped for a negation-complete consistent theory for the whole of mathematics, because, in his word, there is no ignorabimus about negation-complete consistent theories; in some sense, they are cognitively ideal: All (internalised) proof goals are definite [Mos06] , here in the sense that their truth or falsehood can be determined unambiguously (and here even effectively by an agent) by means of (internalised) proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Moreover, negation-complete theories, though necessarily non-intuitionistic (!), nevertheless enjoy the disjunction property of Intuitionistic Logic (IL), 2 which is that if IL φ ∨ φ then IL φ or IL φ (DP) [TvD88] . Thus they have considerable constructive content, and this even by conserving the deductive convenience of the law of the excluded middle! To see why negation-complete theories are necessarily classical, suppose that there is a non-classical negation-complete theory T (i.e., T φ ∨ ¬φ and T φ or T ¬φ) and derive an immediate contradiction therefrom by considering the law of right and left ∨-introduction (set φ := ¬φ), which asserts that if T φ or T φ then T φ ∨ φ (and is also valid in IL). In fact, for classical logical theories, negation completeness is classically equivalent to the disjunction property: Theorem 1. For classical logical theories (filters in Boolean algebras or lattices), negation completeness (maximality or being an ultrafilter) is classically equivalent to the disjunction property (the property of being a prime filter).
Proof. Suppose that T is a classical logical theory with language L (i.e., for all φ ∈ L, T φ ∨ ¬φ). For the if-direction, suppose that for all φ ∈ L, T φ or T ¬φ, and let φ, φ ∈ L. Let us proceed by case analysis of this disjunction. First suppose that T φ. Hence T φ or T φ , and thus T φ ∨ φ (vacously) implies T φ or T φ . Now suppose that T ¬φ. Further suppose that T φ∨φ . Hence T φ , and thus T φ or T φ . For the only-if direction, suppose that for all φ, φ ∈ L, T φ ∨ φ implies T φ or T φ , and let φ ∈ L.
Internalising negation-complete proof theories, LDiiP thus internalises their disjunction property, as the theorem schema LDiiP (M a (φ∨φ )) → ((M a φ)∨ M a φ ), which is why we call our internalised proofs also disjunctive. Yet given first, the classicality (and normality) of LDiiP, and second, Theorem 1, which applies to the theories that LDiiP internalises, we could as well have stipulated the internalised disjunction property as axiom schema and then derived the internalised negation completeness therefrom as theorem schema. That is, in arbitrary classical normal modal logics, we can make the following deduction, where the universal meta-quantification over φ and φ in Line 1 is left implicit:
To see also the computational content in negation-complete consistent theories with a recursive axiomatisation as claimed in the beginning, recall from classical recursion theory [LdR04] that such theories are actually also recursive (algorithmically decidable) as a whole, i.e., not only in their set of axioms: The recursiveness of the axioms of a theory implies the recursive enumerability of its theorems. So in order to decide whether or not φ ∈ T for a given φ ∈ L in the language L of such a theory T, start the enumeration process. By the negation completeness of T, either φ or ¬φ will pop up. If φ pops up then stop, and conclude that φ ∈ T; if ¬φ pops up then stop, and conclude that φ ∈ T by the consistency of T. In summary, the cognitive, constructive, and computational content of recursively axiomatised negation-complete consistent theories is distilled in their maximal consistency, disjunction property, and algorithmic decidability, respectively. However, their scope is far from the one of Hilbert's hope: Gödel ascertained the negation-incompleteness of any recursively axiomatised consistent theory containing the Peano-Arithmetic (PA) part of mathematics [LdR04, Fit07b] . Worse, consistent theories containing PA are also algorithmically undecidable [LdR04] . Notwithstanding, recursively axiomatised negation-complete consistent theories, which are thus strictly weaker than PA, are crucial for practical applications. (Maximal consistent sets are also crucial for theoretical applications such as the canonical-model construction for axiomatic completeness proofs, cf. Appendix A.3.2).
Practical application
Both the external as well as the internalised form of negation completeness have important practical applications. Important practical applications of the external form " φ or ¬φ " of negation completeness, which have become classics in computer science and engineering, are logic databases and programming. There, the external form " φ or ¬φ " classically corresponds to the principle of negation as failure " φ implies ¬φ ", i.e., ¬φ can be inferred if every possible proof of φ fails [Cla78, Rei78] . Another important practical application of a modal-logical variant " K a (φ) implies ¬K a (φ) " of negation as failure is artificial intelligence [Par91] , where K a (φ) reads as "agent a knows that φ (is true)." There, this epistemic variant of negation as failure produces a non-monotonic logic of knowledge for multi-agent distributed systems. (This is also the only piece of related work that we are aware of.) An important practical applications of our internalised form LDiiP (M a φ) ∨ M a ¬φ of negation completeness is accountability for dependable multi-agent distributed systems (e.g., electronic voting systems [KR11] , and, more generally, the whole Internet [Lan09] ). A multi-agent distributed system S is accountable by definition if and only if S is abuse-free and auditable [KR10] : For all agents b in S, (abusefreeness), whenever b behaves correctly (as an agent in S), b can prove to all agents a (including to herself) in S that she does so, and, (auditability), whenever b behaves incorrectly (and thus is faulty), every or at least one other agent c in S will eventually be able to prove to all agents a in S (including to herself and b) that b is faulty, (cf. [KR10] for a formal transcription of this natural-language formulation). In such a system S, each agent b's behaviour in terms of her past actions can be recorded in a log file [Chu09] (say M ) that is broadcast; and it is this log file M that must be constructed so as to have sufficient evidential strength to constitute a negation-complete proof with respect to the proof goal of b behaving correctly (expressed with an atomic formula correct(b)):
In other words, M must constitute decisive evidence or, in yet other words, be an epistemic decider to a about the (ephemeral) issue of b's correctness. (b can change her behaviour!) That is, LDiiP is a formal theory of epistemic deciders. For abuse-freeness (auditability), the prover b (c) must (eventually) know such an M , written b k M (c k M ). We will present formal definitions in Section 2 and a full formal case study in future work (cf. [KR10] for a preliminary, nonaxiomatic accountability case study). Finally, note that a piece of decisive evidence M for correct(b) brought to the attention of a judge a can be viewed as a kind of forensic trace, since M allows a to decide whether or not b is correct and thus to decide whether or not b is guilty of behaving incorrectly.
Contribution
Conceptual contributions Our conceptual contributions in this paper are the following. First, we produce a novel modal logic of negation-complete or disjunctive interactive proofs (cf. Theorem 3), which internalises agent-centric negation-complete consistent proof theories (enjoying the disjunction property) and has important theoretical and practical applications. Second, we offer the insights that the price to pay for negation completeness and disjunctiveness is the non-monotonicity and non-communality of the resulting agent-centric notion of proof (cf. Fact 1 and 5, respectively), which turns out to be also a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief (cf. Corollary 2). Third, we contribute a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of standard S5-knowledge (cf. Corollary 3), constructed from our notion of proof.
Technical contributions Our technical contributions are the following. First, we provide a standard but also oracle-computational and set-theoretically constructive Kripke-semantics for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2). Like in [Kra12b] , we endow the proof modality with a standard Kripke-semantics [BvB07] , but whose accessibility relation M R a we first define constructively in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions, 3 namely as M R a , and then match to an abstract semantic interface in standard form (which abstractly stipulates the characteristic properties of the accessibility relation [Fit07a] ). We will say that M R a exemplifies (or realises) M R a . (A simple example of a constructive definition of a modal accessibility is the well-known definition of epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability defined in terms of equality of state projections [FHMV95] .) The Kripke-semantics for LDiiP is oracle-computational in the sense that (cf. Definition 3) the individual proof knowledge (say M ) can be thought of as being provided by an imaginary computation oracle, which thus acts as a hypothetical provider and imaginary epistemic source of our interactive proofs. Second, we prove Theorem 2, which establishes the proof-terms-as-truth-values view as well as a normal form for the special case of a singleton agent universe. Third, we prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4) and the algorithmic decidability of LDiiP (cf. Corollary 4). (Negation completeness implies algorithmic decidability as seen in Section 1.1.1, but not vice versa as LDiiP testifies.)
Roadmap
In the next section, we introduce our Logic of Disjunctive instant interactive Proofs (LDiiP) axiomatically by means of a compact closure operator that induces the Hilbert-style proof system that we seek. We then gain the (syntactic) insight that negation completeness implies non-monotonicity (cf. Fact 1), and prove the above-mentioned Theorem 2 as well as Corollary 2 and 3 within the obtained system. Next, we introduce the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard abstract semantic interface for LDiiP (cf. Section 2.2), and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface (cf. Theorem 3). We justify the existence of the constructive semantics of LDiiP by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's (cf. Table 1 ) and then also construct it in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function, from which we gain the (semantic) insight that negation completeness implies non-communality (cf. Fact 5). Last but not least, we prove the finite-model property (cf. Theorem 4) and, therefrom, the algorithmic decidability (cf. Corollary 4) of LDiiP.
LDiiP 2.1 Syntactically
Like the Logic of instant interactive Proofs (LiiP), the Logic of Disjunctive instant interactive Proofs (LDiiP) provides a modal formula language over a generic message term language. The formula language of LDiiP offers the propositional constructors, a relational symbol ' k ' for constructing atomic propositions about individual knowledge (e.g., a k M ), and a modal constructor ' a ' for propositions about proofs (e.g., M a φ). In brief, LDiiP is a minimal extension of classical propositional logic with an interactively generalised additional operator (the proof modality) and proof-term language. Note, the language of LDiiP is identical to the one of LiiP [Kra12b] modulo the proof-modality notation, which in LiiP is ' :: C a ', where a acts as proof checker and C as a's peer group.
Definition 1 (The language of LDiiP). Let
• A = ∅ designate a non-empty finite set of agent names a, b, c, etc.
• M designate a language of message terms M such that a ∈ M
• P designate a denumerable set of propositional variables P constrained such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M, (a k M ) ∈ P (for "a knows M ") is a distinguished variable, i.e., an atomic proposition, (for individual knowledge)
(So a k · where a ∈ A is a unary relational symbol.)
• L φ ::= P ¬φ φ ∧ φ M a φ designate our language of logical formulas φ, where M a φ reads "M can disjunctively prove that φ to a."
Then LDiiP has the following axiom and deduction-rule schemas, where grey-shading indicates the remaining essential differences to LiiP [Kra12b] .
Definition 2 (The axioms and deduction rules of LDiiP). Let
• Γ 0 designate an adequate set of axioms for classical propositional logic
designate the axiom schemas of LDiiP.
Then, LDiiP := Cl(∅) := n∈N Cl n (∅), where for all Γ ⊆ L:
We call LDiiP a base theory, and Cl(Γ) an LDiiP-theory for any Γ ⊆ L.
Notice the logical order of LDiiP, which like LiiP's is, due to propositions about (proofs of) propositions, higher-order propositional. From LiiP [Kra12b] , we recall the discussions of Kripke's law (K), the law of epistemic truthfulness, and the law of necessitation (N): The key to the validity of K is that we understand interactive proofs as sufficient evidence for intended resource-unbounded proof-checking agents (who are though still unable to guess). Clearly for such agents, if M is sufficient evidence for φ → φ and φ then so is M for φ . Then, the significance of epistemic truthfulness to interactivity is that in truly distributed multi-agent systems, not all proofs are known by all agents, i.e., agents are not omniscient with respect to messages. Otherwise, why communicate with each other? So there being a proof does not imply knowledge of that proof. When an agent a does not know the proof and the agent cannot generate the proof ex nihilo herself by guessing it, only communication from a peer, who thus acts as an oracle, can entail the knowledge of the proof with a. Next, the justification for N is that in interactive settings, validities, and thus a fortiori tautologies (in the strict sense of validities of the propositional fragment), are in some sense trivialities [Kra12a] . To see why, recall that modal validities are true in all pointed models (cf. Definition 5), and thus not worth being communicated from one point to another in a given model, e.g., by means of specific interactive proofs. (Nothing is logically more embarrassing than talking in tautologies.) Therefore, validities deserve arbitrary proofs. What is worth being communicated are truths weaker than validities, namely local truths in the standard modeltheoretic sense (cf. Definition 5), which may not hold universally. Otherwise why communicate with each other? We continue to discuss the remaining, new axioms and rules. As mentioned, the message language M of LDiiP is generic, and thus a k M will require axioms that are appropriate to the term structure of the chosen M ∈ M (such as those required for LiiP [Kra12b] ). The axiom schema of self-knowledge reads "M can disjunctively prove to a that a knows M ", whose validity is justified by oracle computation: "if a were to receive M , e.g., from an oracle, then a would know M " (cf. Definition 3). (The law of self-knowledge is also valid in LiiP, where it corresponds to the theorem [but not axiom] schema M ::
The axiom schema of proof consistency and negation completeness internalises (external theory) consistency and negation completeness, respectively (cf. Section 1.1.1).
Now note the following macro-definitions: := a a a k a, ⊥ := ¬ , φ∨φ := ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬φ ), φ → φ := ¬φ ∨ φ , and φ ↔ φ := (φ → φ ) ∧ (φ → φ).
Proposition 1 (Hilbert-style proof system). Let
LDiiP φ :iff {φ} LDiiP φ and {φ } LDiiP φ
• LDiiP φ :iff ∅ LDiiP φ.
In other words, LDiiP ⊆ 2 L × L is a system of closure conditions in the sense of [Tay99, Definition 3.7.4]. For example:
1. for all axioms φ ∈ Γ 2 , LDiiP φ 2. for modus ponens, {φ, φ → φ } LDiiP φ 3. for necessitation, {φ} LDiiP M a φ.
(In the space-saving, horizontal Hilbert-notation "Φ LDiiP φ", Φ is not a set of hypotheses but a set of premises, cf. modus ponens, necessitation, and epistemic bitonicity.) Then LDiiP can be viewed as being defined by a Cl-induced Hilbertstyle proof system. In fact Cl : 2 L → 2 L is a standard consequence operator, i.e., a substitution-invariant compact closure operator.
Proof. Like in [Kra12a] . That a Hilbert-style proof system can be viewed as induced by a compact closure operator is well-known (e.g., see [Gab95] ); that Cl is indeed such an operator can be verified by inspection of the inductive definition of Cl; and substitution invariance follows from our definitional use of axiom schemas.
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Corollary 1 (Normality). LDiiP is a normal modal logic.
Proof. Jointly by Kripke's law, modus ponens, necessitation (these by definition), and substitution invariance (cf. Proposition 1).
Note that in LDiiP, an analog of the primitive LiiP-rule
would be invalid (because incompatible with negation completeness) and thus is not admitted in LDiiP. A fortiori, an analog of the stronger primitive LiP-rule
by which proof monotonicity LiP (M :
C a φ under paired data M can be deduced, would be invalid and thus is not admitted in LDiiP either. We can thus assert the following negative fact about our negation-complete proofs.
Fact 1. Negation completeness implies non-monotonicity.
Proof. 1 and 2 are well-known for necessity modalities in arbitrary normal modal logics. For 3 , consider that LDiiP ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) since ¬φ ↔ (φ → ⊥) is a classical tautology, and then deduce LDiiP (M a ¬φ) ↔ M a (φ → ⊥) by 1.
We continue to present the first important result about LDiiP (cf. Theorem 2). Lemma 1.
The laws of self-proof of truthfulness and proof density also hold in LiiP [Kra12b] .
Theorem 2 (Proof terms as Truth values).
Proof. See Appendix A.2 "IDP" abbreviates "Internalised Disjunction Property." The laws are enumerated in a (total) order that respects their respective proof prerequisites. Notice that Theorem 2.2-2.5 are modal distributivity laws. They assert that the proof modality of LDiiP is fully distributive over (binary) Boolean operators. While the laws of proof conjunction bis and modal idempotency also hold in LiiP [Kra12b] , only the if-direction of the laws IDP bis and K bis hold in LiiP. Notice also that modal idempotency combines proof density (cf. Lemma 1.2) and proof transitivity (cf. Line l of the proof of modal idempotency). Like in LiiP and LiP, the key to the validity of modal idempotency is that each agent (e.g., a) can act herself as proof checker, see [Kra12a, Section 3.2.2] for more details. The law of modal idempotency bis is a generalisation of modal idempotency. Observe that when |A| = 1, Theorem 2 implies that all occurrences of the proof modality in a compound LDiiP-formula can be compiled away in the sense that all these occurrences can be pushed in front of possibly negated atomic sub-formulas (i.e., literals) of the compound formula. Hence in this case, we can understand proof terms as truth-values in the spirit of a form of realizability interpretation of constructive logic [Tro98, Section 7.8]. Otherwise, i.e., when |A| > 1 (recall from Definition 1 that A = ∅), it is possible that not all such occurrences in a compound formula can be compiled away (cf. modal idempotency bis, i.e., Theorem 2.7).
The following corollary asserts that our negation-complete or disjunctive proof modality is an explicit refinement of the standard belief modality [MV07] .
Corollary 2 (Negation-complete Disjunctive Explicit Belief). 'M a ·' is a negation-complete disjunctive KD45-modality of explicit agent belief, where M represents the explicit evidence term that can justify agent a's belief.
Proof. Consider that 'M a ·' satisfies Kripke's law (K, cf. Definition 2), the Dlaw (called "proof consistency" in Definition 2), the 4-law (cf. the only-if part of Theorem 2.6), necessitation (cf. Definition 2), and negation completeness (cf. Definition 2), and thus the internalised disjunction property (cf. the if-part of Theorem 2.3). That 'M a ·' also satisfies the 5-law can be proved as follows:
In the following corollary, we construct also a disjunctive but negationincomplete explicit refinement of the standard knowledge modality [MV07, FHMV95, HR10] .
Corollary 3 (Disjunctive Explicit Knowledge). 'a k M ∧ M a ·' is a disjunctive but negation-incomplete S5-modality of explicit agent knowledge, where M represents the explicit evidence term that does justify agent a's knowledge.
Proof. By Corollary 2 and the fact that the truth law LDiiP (a k M ∧M a φ) → φ (abbreviated as T but implicit in "S5") for the modality 'a k M ∧ M a ·' is equivalent to the law of epistemic truthfulness (cf. Definition 2). Note that although the modality 'a k M ∧ M a ·' is evidently disjunctive, i.e., LDiiP
because of the arbitrariness of Γ 1 (cf. Definition 2). Fixing Γ 1 so that a resourceunbounded agent a unable to guess knows all messages M could only make sense for A = {a}. Otherwise, i.e., when all agents know all messages, why interact with each other?
This result is a syntactic complement to previous results from a foundational study about the (un)definability of S5-knowledge in terms of belief [HSS09] .
Semantically
We continue to present the concretely constructed semantics as well as the standard abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to this interface. We justify the existence of the constructive semantics of LDiiP by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's [Kra12b] and then also construct it in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function.
Concretely
The ingredients for the concrete semantics of LiiP, from which we will construct the concrete semantics of LDiiP, are displayed in Table 1 . Therefrom, we will only need a concrete instance of S and msgs a , and an abstract instance of cl 
Notice that the Axiom of Choice is non-constructive in that it abstractly asserts the conditional existence of a certain f but without actually providing a concrete example of such an f . Thus our problem now is to find such an f for M R C a , which will allow us to construct a functional concrete accessibility for LDiiP. In Definition 3, we construct such an f as an oracle-computational function σ M a on concrete states constructed inductively in terms of certain generalised successor functions. The essential differences in Definition 3 to Table 1 are grey-shaded. M designate a raw-data extractor that extracts (without analysing) the (finite) set of messages from a system state s that agent a ∈ A has either generated (assuming that only a can generate a's signature) or else received as such (not only as a strict subterm of another message); that is, msgs a (s) is a's data base in s • M R a ⊆ S ×S designate a concretely constructed accessibility relationshort, concrete accessibility-for the negation-complete disjunctive proof modality such that for all s, s ∈ S, Proof. Clearly, if cl a is computable then σ M a is computable, and similarly for 2.
In particular when cl a = id 2 M , that is, when cl a is the identity function on 2 M (a performs no data-mining operations), M R a is polynomial-time computable. Table 1 . Then:
Proof. Fix cl a as in Table 1 . For 1, consider that s < However notice that we have lost C in M R a , because σ M a simply disregards C. This is the price for the functionality of M R a . Actually, M R a (for LDiiP) is a functional analog of < M a (for LiiP, see Table 1 ). And it is impossible to construct a functional analog of M R C a from a union of M R a over C, because such a union of functions need not be a function anymore. In contrast, it is possible to construct a functional analog of M R C a from an intersection of M R a over C, since such an intersection of functions is again a function. Yet unfortunately it then need not be total anymore! We can thus assert the following negative fact about our negation-complete proofs. This fact could be useful to establish the theoretical and thus also practical impossibility of engineering social procedures [PP06] for which negation completeness would be a necessary condition. Due to the same fact, there is no community parameter C in ' a ' and, in particular, no LDiiP-analog of the LiiP-axiom LiiP (M ::
C a φ (see [Kra12b] ). Note that if we were to mix LiiP-and LDiiP-modalities in a single logic, the formula (M :: 
Abstractly
We now continue to present the abstract semantic interface for LDiiP, and prove the axiomatic adequacy of the proof system with respect to it.
Definition 4 (Kripke-model). We define the satisfaction relation ' |=' for LDiiP in Table 2 , where
S designates a usual valuation function, yet partially predefined such that for all a ∈ A and M ∈ M,
for S assumed abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1 and cl s a like in Definition 3 but with msgs a abstract (and thus general) like in Table 1 Table 2 : Satisfaction relation (S, V), s |= P :iff s ∈ V(P ) (S, V), s |= ¬φ :iff not (S, V), s |= φ (S, V), s |= φ ∧ φ :iff (S, V), s |= φ and (S, V), s |= φ (S, V), s |= M a φ :iff for all s ∈ S, if s M R a s then (S, V), s |= φ
) designates a (modal) frame for LDiiP with an abstractly constrained accessibility relation-short, abstract accessibility-M R a ⊆ S × S for the negation-complete disjunctive proof modality such that-the semantic interface:
-there is s ∈ S such that s M R a s (seriality/totality)
Looking back, we recognise that Proposition 2 actually establishes the important fact that our concrete accessibility M R a in Definition 3 realises all the properties stipulated by our abstract accessibility M R a in Definition 4; we say that M R a exemplifies (or realises) M R a .
Theorem 3 (Axiomatic adequacy).
LDiiP is adequate for |=, i.e.,:
Proof. Both parts can be proved with standard means: soundness follows as usual from the admissibility of the axioms and rules (cf. Appendix A.3.1); and completeness follows by means of the classical construction of canonical models, using Lindenbaum's construction of maximally consistent sets (cf. Appendix A.3.2). 
, and choose Γ to be the (finite) sub-formula closure of φ. Hence, we are left to prove that M min,Γ flt is indeed an LDiiP-model, which means that we are left to prove that M R min,Γ a has all the properties stipulated by the semantic interface of LDiiP:
inherits seriality/totality as well as determinism/functionality from M R a , as can be seen by inspecting the definition of M R min,Γ a ;
• for conditional reflexivity, suppose that M ∈ cl Proof. In order to algorithmically decide whether or not "φ ∈ LDiiP" (that is, " LDiiP φ"), axiomatic adequacy allows us to check whether or not ¬φ is locally satisfiable (that is, whether or not "M, s |= ¬φ" for some LDiiP-model M and state s). But then, the finite-model property of LDiiP allows us to enumerate all finite LDiiP-models M fin up to a size of at most 2 to the power of the size n of the sub-formula closure of ¬φ and to check whether or not "M fin , s |= ¬φ". (There are at most 2 n equivalence classes for n formulas.)
So in some sense, we have proved the algorithmic decidability of the epistemic decisiveness of the evidence terms in LDiiP. Note that the algorithmic complexity of LDiiP will depend on the specific choice of Γ 1 in Definition 2.
Conclusion
We have produced LDiiP from LiiP with as main contributions those described in Section 1.2. In future work, we shall work out dynamic and first-order extensions of LDiiP as well as the preliminary case study [KR10] mentioned in Section 1.1.2. M a ¬φ))) c, e, PL (g) LDiiP 
a, l, PL.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
A.3.1 Axiomatic soundness Definition 5 (Truth & Validity [BvB07] ).
• The formula φ ∈ L is true (or satisfied ) in the model (S, V) at the state s ∈ S :iff (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable in the model (S, V) :iff there is s ∈ S such that (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is globally true (or globally satisfied ) in the model (S, V), written (S, V) |= φ, :iff for all s ∈ S, (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is satisfiable :iff there is a model (S, V) and a state s ∈ S such that (S, V), s |= φ.
• The formula φ is valid, written |= φ, :iff for all models (S, V), (S, V) |= φ.
Proposition 3 (Admissibility of LDiiP-specific axioms and rules). Now for (2), let w, w , w ∈ W and suppose that w M C a w and w M C a w . That is, (for all φ ∈ L, if M a φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w ) and (for all φ ∈ L, if M a φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w ). Now let φ ∈ L and suppose that
• φ ∈ w . Hence ¬φ ∈ w because w is consistent. Hence M a ¬φ ∈ w by particularisation of the first supposition with ¬φ and modus tollens.
Hence M a φ ∈ w by the Reflection Lemma. Hence φ ∈ w by the second supposition and modus ponens.
• φ ∈ w . Hence φ ∈ w -symmetrically.
For (3), let w ∈ W and suppose that M ∈ cl w a (∅). Hence a k M ∈ w due to the maximality of w. Further suppose that M a φ ∈ w. Since w is maximal, (M a φ) → (a k M → φ) ∈ w (epistemic truthfulness).
Hence, a k M → φ ∈ w, and φ ∈ w, by consecutive modus ponens.
For (4), let w, w ∈ W and suppose that w M C a w . That is, for all φ ∈ L, if M a φ ∈ w then φ ∈ w . Since w is maximal, M a a k M ∈ w (self-knowledge).
Hence a k M ∈ w by particularisation of the supposition, and thus M ∈ cl 
